{"id":5338,"date":"2021-04-04T23:01:10","date_gmt":"2021-04-05T03:01:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/?p=5338"},"modified":"2023-12-20T02:53:23","modified_gmt":"2023-12-20T07:53:23","slug":"archegos-the-questions-nobody-asks","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/2021\/04\/04\/archegos-the-questions-nobody-asks\/","title":{"rendered":"Archegos: the questions nobody asks"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-5421 alignright size-medium\" src=\"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Four-barrel-gun-left-300x200.jpg\" alt=\"Four-barrel gun\" width=\"300\" height=\"200\" srcset=\"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Four-barrel-gun-left-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Four-barrel-gun-left-510x342.jpg 510w, https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Four-barrel-gun-left-480x321.jpg 480w, https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Four-barrel-gun-left.jpg 512w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/>There has been a lot of press articles on the Archegos blow-up already, but many important questions have still not been asked.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3>The factual background<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Archegos Capital Management is a <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>family office<\/strong><\/span>, which manages the money of Sung Kook &#8220;Bill&#8221; Hwang since 2013. Hwang is a &#8220;Tiger Cub&#8221;, a former PM\/Analyst from famous Tiger Management. Hwang was managing <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>$500m of his own money<\/strong><\/span>, which he earned through his role as a portfolio manager in the previous decade.<\/li>\n<li>Hwang started as a stock Salesman in early 90&#8217;s at Hyundai Securities. After a legal battle which started in 2009, Hwang and his firm Tiger Asia Management <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>pleaded guilty in 2012 to insider trading &amp; stock manipulation charges<\/strong><\/span>. They <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sec.gov\/news\/press-release\/2012-2012-264htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">settled $44m<\/a> with the SEC and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2014-10-09\/tiger-asia-hwang-banned-from-trading-in-hong-kong-for-4-years\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">HKD 45m with the HK Securities and Futures Commission<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>Archegos is actually the new name of his old company Tiger Asia Management. The firm is <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>based in New York<\/strong><\/span>, since Hwang was banned from trading in Hong-Kong in 2014, as well as other Asian markets in which he specialized.<\/li>\n<li>Archegos held large concentrated bets in a few companies, notably ViacomCBS, Discovery, Baidu, Tencent and Vipshop.<\/li>\n<li>Besides his own stock positions (already large), he also <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>held stocks synthetically through swaps at prime brokers<\/strong><\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The primes didn&#8217;t know of the extent of his other prime relations and how large the positions were. The overall position was not $10bn, but more than $50bn &#8211; rumored to reach $100 bn.<\/li>\n<li>The list of affected primes is increasing. <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Only JP and Deutsche seem to have escaped that wreckage<\/strong><\/span>. JP, because they refused to offer services to Archegos, and Deutsche, because they were quick to offload positions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>The unbundling<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>His large <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>direct and synthetic acquisitions pushed the stocks up<\/strong><\/span>, often becoming one of the largest shareholders, just with regular stock ownership.<\/li>\n<li>It is speculated that Hwang accepted, if not bet, on the stock rise since momentum traders would have to follow-up and purchase more shares. The stock would also attract activist retail traders (think &#8220;a new Gamestop!&#8221;)<\/li>\n<li>ViacomCBS notably went up 300% in early 2021, surely thanks to its well-delivered online movie platform Paramount+, but surely also thanks to Hwang&#8217;s purchases.<img decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-5347 aligncenter size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Viacom-CBS-2019-2020-Yahoo-Finance-2-e1617391110908.jpg\" alt=\"Viacom CBS 2019-2020\" width=\"650\" height=\"349\" \/><\/li>\n<li>Unfortunately, late <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>on March 22nd, ViacomCBS announced a $3 bn stock and convertible bond sale<\/strong><\/span> to cash in on its $100 stock price. The <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>stock dropped 10% on the open<\/strong><\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>Analysts announced <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>stock downgrades<\/strong><\/span>. The stock loses another $20 in the next few days.<\/li>\n<li>On March 25th, some of the prime brokers <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>called Archegos on margin<\/strong><\/span>, or at least to sell some stocks to free capital and meet the margin call. Hwang adamantly refused. A posteriori, we can guess that he would never have freed enough capital, and that the stock sale would have generated more margin call, starting a snowball effect.<\/li>\n<li><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>The primes talked to each other that day<\/strong><\/span>. Credit Suisse wanted to give him a few days. Goldman and Morgan Stanley <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>seized the collateral<\/strong><\/span>\u00a0instead.<\/li>\n<li>On Friday, March 26th, and maybe during the weekend as well, <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Goldman sold $3.3bn of ViacomCBS collateral<\/strong><\/span> via block sales before the open. Deutsche quickly <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2021-03-31\/deutsche-bank-dodged-4-billion-archegos-bullet-with-quick-sale\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">unwound $4bn of shares, notably to Marshall Wace<\/a>. Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo followed. The stock ended the day around $45, down ~50% from its top.<img decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-5352 aligncenter size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/viac-sells-shares-e1617393824925.jpg\" alt=\"VIAC downfall\" width=\"650\" height=\"380\" \/><\/li>\n<li>On Monday, Zurich time, <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Credit Suisse announced that it faces a &#8220;highly significant loss&#8221;<\/strong><\/span>. Its share fell 21%. The rumor mill indicates $4-5 bn of losses. The firm, which recently took losses for the Luckin Coffee fraud, the Greensill Capital collapse, as well as a <a href=\"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/2021\/02\/09\/how-to-compound-your-regulatory-problems\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">laundry list of other compliance issues<\/a>, is now considering <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2021-04-04\/credit-suisse-weighs-replacing-risk-chief-after-month-of-miscues\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">exiting its CRO and its investment bank head<\/a> (respectively Lara Warner and Brian Chin). Closer to home for the shareholders, Credit Suisse has a CHF1.5 bn ($1.6bn) share buy-back in progress, and it is now at risk.<\/li>\n<li><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Nomura announced a $2bn loss<\/strong><\/span>. The stock barely moved.<\/li>\n<li>JP Morgan estimates there is <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>$10bn of loss spread between Wall Street banks<\/strong><\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>The questions everybody asks<\/h3>\n<p>Archegos was estimated to have $10 bn of capital at the time of the events.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-5422 alignleft size-medium\" src=\"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Shipwreck-300x190.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"190\" srcset=\"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Shipwreck-300x190.jpg 300w, https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Shipwreck-768x486.jpg 768w, https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Shipwreck-480x304.jpg 480w, https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Shipwreck.jpg 800w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>At the time of its wreck, the fund was rumored to have 50-100bn of exposure through swaps. That would be a <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>5x &#8211; 10x leverage<\/strong><\/span> on an indicated capital of $10 bn. That level of leverage is rarely offered by primes. Only the biggest, most diversified and excellent risk manager hedge funds like Citadel or Millennium are offered that type of leverage. <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>A concentrated stock picker would be offered probably around 2x, at best 3x<\/strong><\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>The reason Archegos was able to gain such high leverage, was because the primes didn&#8217;t know of the existence of so many other prime brokers (8?) supporting Archegos&#8230; in the same trades! <strong>There is here a <\/strong><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>structural issue at the confluence of confidentiality and leverage<\/strong><\/span>.<\/li>\n<li><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Hwang had a checkered past<\/strong><\/span>. He was caught manipulating stocks, and trading on insider information. He was a persona non grata in Asia. <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Why was he offered so much leverage in the US?<\/strong><\/span> We all know that primes prefer big famous PMs to smaller less-known PMs, but there are some risk-management issues to be learned here.<\/li>\n<li>The fact that a fund was able to leverage so much &#8211; and costing so much to Wall Street &#8211; by hiding its multiple swaps is a <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>glaring fault from a risk-management perspective<\/strong><\/span>.\n<ul>\n<li>The world of prime brokerage and swap trading is competitive, and <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>banks do not disclose to each other<\/strong><\/span> how much leverage they extend to their clients (or even which clients they have).<\/li>\n<li>In a world with low interest rates, the <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>client-facing synthetic equity business is valuable<\/strong><\/span>. It is mathematically market risk-free (no VaR, only credit risk), while real money (institutionals and family offices) are considered very safe credit-wise. It is also profitable, with probably 20-40 bp margin, posted against a highly leverageable balance sheet.<\/li>\n<li><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Building prime brokerage activities is not cheap<\/strong><\/span> &#8211; systems, staff, compliance, support functions, etc, require top dollars. Banks have heavily invested in the activity, because <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>prime brokerage becomes highly profitable when it reaches a critical mass of large hedge funds and family offices<\/strong><\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>As a result, banks <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>are bending over backward<\/strong><\/span> to attract and keep these top clients. This explains why Archegos was able to bend the rules and acquire extra leverage.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>The Archegos situation is also <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>a problem from a regulatory perspective<\/strong><\/span>.\n<ul>\n<li>There are <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>no disclosure requirements for family offices<\/strong><\/span>, which are neither banks (heavily regulated) nor hedge funds (lightly and recently regulated). [Family offices are investment vehicles for a single investor. Because a 401(k) also fulfills that definition, a minimum of $100m in assets is usually considered as a minimum. If there are probably 50k individuals with that wealth, and 5-10k are managing their wealth themselves in a family office.]<\/li>\n<li>Family and multi-family offices are now managing an estimated <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>$6 trillion in assets<\/strong><\/span>.\u00a0For comparison, the ETF business is now around $7.5 tn, and it is highly regulated and closely monitored.<\/li>\n<li>Now, there is plenty of criticism already about the source of the wealth from wealthy families, or how they (mis-)manage their wealth, or how they influence the world&#8230; Some of these questions deserve to be asked if there is some wrongdoing. But I think also that people are entitled to some privacy. If Bill Gates wants to invest into farm land or Coca-Cola, that is his absolute right and none of our business. <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Which means regulating family office and private wealth like other asset managers is probably over-the-top<\/strong><\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-5386 alignright size-medium\" src=\"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/leverage-300x161.gif\" alt=\"Leverage\" width=\"300\" height=\"161\" srcset=\"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/leverage-300x161.gif 300w, https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/leverage-768x412.gif 768w, https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/leverage-980x525.gif 980w, https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/leverage-480x257.gif 480w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/>The questions nobody asks<\/h3>\n<p>Now, there are inconsistencies in the currently available information. Here are some of the questions which needs to be asked:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>If Hwang started with $500m, where do the $10bn come from?<\/strong><\/span> Archegos is said to be a single-family office, and therefore has no other investors.\n<ul>\n<li>So, Archegos would have <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>leveraged $500m into $10 bn of assets by trading stocks on margin<\/strong><\/span>. A 20x leverage? Unlikely.<\/li>\n<li><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Archegos accumulated gains from $500m to $10bn<\/strong><\/span>. A 20x gain over six years cannot happen unless you are highly leveraged. And if you are highly leveraged, the losses can be as fast as the gains.<\/li>\n<li>Or a combination of both.<\/li>\n<li><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Anyhow, it is obvious that Archegos was highly leveraged<\/strong><\/span>.<\/li>\n<li>And if you have any doubt, that leverage would have shown in the <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Sharpe and volatility monitoring<\/strong><\/span> executed by the primes.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>We do not know the origin of the $10 bn he was indicated as managing. <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Was he managing money from other investors in his family office?<\/strong><\/span> If he was, he may be swimming with concrete shoes sooner than later.<\/li>\n<li><span style=\"font-size: 14px; text-decoration-line: underline;\"><strong>We have no true idea of Archegos positions<\/strong><\/span><span style=\"font-size: 14px;\">. Right now, we only hear rumors on positions and leverages. JP says there is $10 bn of losses between the various PBs. Where is that information coming from?<\/span><\/li>\n<li>Hwang has managed a hedge fund. He knows the difference between long-only and long-short. <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Was he really long only, without market hedge, with his own money?<\/strong><\/span> Was he instead shorting stocks against his known longs, in a <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>relative value<\/strong><\/span> play?\n<ul>\n<li>The $50bn would be the gross capital, aka 2x $25 bn. That reduces the leverage by as much. But we haven&#8217;t heard of any short wins\/losses.<\/li>\n<li>Also, even $25bn of S&amp;P futures creates a lot of margin calls when the S&amp;P goes from 2,500 to 4,000+&#8230;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>The prime-brokers would have had a conversation on March 25th to decide between themselves what to do with the Archegos situation. <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Such<\/strong> <strong>a conversation between primes is hard to believe<\/strong><\/span>:\n<ul>\n<li>They are bound by <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>confidentiality requirements<\/strong><\/span>. They simply are not allowed to discuss their clients&#8217; positions to anybody (but regulators).<\/li>\n<li>The PM would have had to agree to the call, if not be present on the call. <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Why would Hwang have agreed to that call?<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Prime brokers talking between themselves of the overleverage? Credit Suisse asking for time? That&#8217;s not how it works.<\/strong><\/span> As soon as the PBs would have realized the extent of the leverage from the conversation, they would immediately have started liquidating the positions. <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>The first one to rush to the door has a chance of making it alive<\/strong><\/span>. The 3rd or the 5th does not. It is unlikely they would discuss such a coordinated action, because they know that the other brokers were not going to respect the rule.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-5423 alignleft size-medium\" src=\"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Negative-100-bill-300x125.jpg\" alt=\"Negative $100 bill\" width=\"300\" height=\"125\" srcset=\"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Negative-100-bill-300x125.jpg 300w, https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Negative-100-bill-768x320.jpg 768w, https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Negative-100-bill-480x200.jpg 480w, https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/04\/Negative-100-bill.jpg 960w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/>How is it possible that <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>PBs would have lent billions based on Archegos STATED (not deposited) AUM<\/strong><\/span>? Primes lend based on the money deposited on their account. If Archegos say that it is worth $10bn, but deposits only $1bn, a prime would only leverage the $1bn, not the $10 bn. So how could we reach $50 or $100bn of TRS?<\/li>\n<li>I have never met Hwang. Some of my contacts have. He doesn&#8217;t appear to be a perfect angel. Prime brokers are market professionals who have seen a lot, and they know how to read between the lines. He may be a messianic and charismatic presence (large charity donations, an openly strong God-believer, running bible groups&#8230;), but the insider trader and the rule bender are also visible. Settling $50+m with the top regulators for <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>criminal charges<\/strong><\/span> is no small feat. <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>How would so many prime brokers leverage someone with such a history and such a dubious character?<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<li>Also, <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>primes do not decide, but calculate, the allowed leverage<\/strong><\/span>. They take into account the type of risks (concentration, availability of information&#8230;). They use complicated formula and processes. It would be a major faux-pas to over-ride those processes, aka senior management involvement.<\/li>\n<li><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>Did the prime brokers really not know<\/strong><\/span> that he was building large positions through swaps? Maybe Hwang had good insider information and he was avoiding regulatory scrutiny by using swaps? If the brokers knew, then <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>willful blindness<\/strong><\/span> could be another word to describe this situation.<\/li>\n<li>Could it be, that <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>primes got additional information about Archegos that has not been disclosed yet<\/strong><\/span>, say an investigative letter from authorities for instance, and decided to unwind the positions for that reason?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>IMO, <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>we do not have enough information at this stage to truly understand what happened<\/strong><\/span>. In other words, <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\"><strong>the SEC needs to open an investigation<\/strong><\/span>&#8230; if it has not started already.<\/p>\n<p>This investigation will be private, but some statements will surely follow in the months and years to come&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h4>Sources<\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li>Credit Suisse: The Global Wealth report 2020 is accessible <a href=\"https:\/\/www.credit-suisse.com\/about-us\/en\/reports-research\/global-wealth-report.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">here<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>UBS: Global Family Office Report 2019 is accessible <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ubs.com\/global\/en\/wealth-management\/uhnw\/global-family-office-report\/global-family-office-report-2019.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">here<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>Bloomberg, October 2014: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2014-10-09\/tiger-asia-hwang-banned-from-trading-in-hong-kong-for-4-years\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Tiger Asia, Hwang Banned From Trading in Hong Kong for 4 Years<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Business Insider, March 27th, 2021: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.businessinsider.com\/stock-market-wall-street-speculating-hedge-fund-liquidation-archegos-2021-3\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\" data-schema-attribute=\"\">Something weird just went down in the stock market, and Wall Street is speculating it&#8217;s the result of a fund liquidation<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>LinkedIn comment: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/posts\/gdequillacq_something-weird-just-went-down-in-the-stock-activity-6782007088387366912-JQdK\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\" data-schema-attribute=\"\">Something weird just went down the stock market&#8230;<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Epsilon Theory, March 30, 2021: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.epsilontheory.com\/a-tiger-cant-change-its-stripes\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">A Tiger Can\u2019t Change Its Stripes<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>Bloomberg, March 30th, 2021: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/opinion\/articles\/2021-03-30\/wall-street-archegos-collapse-is-business-as-usual-not-a-disaster\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Don&#8217;t Confuse Archegos Collapse With Contagion<\/a>.<\/li>\n<li>Bloomberg, March 31st, 2021: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2021-03-31\/deutsche-bank-dodged-4-billion-archegos-bullet-with-quick-sale\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Deutsche Bank Dodged Archegos Hit With Quick $4 Billion Sale<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Bloomberg: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2021-04-01\/leveraged-blowout-how-hwang-s-archegos-blindsided-global-banks?sref=6uww027M\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Leveraged Blowout: How Hwang\u2019s Archegos Blindsided Global Banks<\/a><\/li>\n<li>The Straight Times, April 1st, 2021: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/business\/banking\/archegos-how-a-little-known-us-investment-firm-shook-global-financial-markets#:~:text=Bill%20Hwang%20and%20the%20family%20office&amp;text=But%20Mr%20Hwang%20shut%20the,So%20Mr%20Hwang%20went%20private.\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Archegos meltdown: What happened at Bill Hwang&#8217;s firm and how it is affecting global markets<\/a><\/li>\n<li>ZeroHedge, April 2nd, 2021: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.zerohedge.com\/markets\/rehypothecated-leverage-how-archegos-built-100-billion-portfolio-out-thin-air-and-then-blew\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Rehypothecated Leverage: How Archegos Built A $100 Billion Portfolio Out Of Thin Air&#8230; And Then Blew Up<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Bloomberg, April 4th, 2021: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2021-04-04\/credit-suisse-weighs-replacing-risk-chief-after-month-of-miscues\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Credit Suisse Weighs Replacing Risk Chief After Miscues<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>What happened at Archegos? A lot has been published already, but many critical questions have still not been asked. After a factual summary \/ press review, this article asks the missing critical questions.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":5421,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14,12,11,13],"tags":[160,158,35,17,125,159,161],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5338"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5338"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5338\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13176,"href":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5338\/revisions\/13176"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5421"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5338"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5338"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/navesinkinternational.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5338"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}